The question of whether a landlord can lawfully secure access to a tenant’s property by force, following the grant of an access injunction, has generated some interest amongst legal professionals following a slew of conflicting first-instance legal decisions.
The recent decision in Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed in the Central London County Court marks a significant shift by the judiciary back in favour of allowing such orders.
It is well established law that where a tenancy agreement contains an express or implied covenant permitting access for inspection, repair or maintenance, the Court may grant an injunction compelling the tenant to provide such access. Breach of such an injunction exposes the tenant to contempt proceedings or possession claims.
The more contentious issue has been whether the Court may go further and authorise the landlord to use force to ensure entry. In the first instance, the decision in Sovereign Housing Association Ltd v Hall (also unreported, in the Bristol County Court, 2024), determined that powers under CPR 70.2A may authorise a landlord to carry out the act required by an injunction where the tenant is a “disobedient party.” On that reasoning, forced entry to facilitate access was permissible as a mechanism to enforce compliance, particularly where the landlord retained a proprietary interest in elements such as the door.
However, this approach was rejected in Southern Housing v Emmanuel [2025] EWCC 58. In this case, the Court took a stricter view of tenants’ possessory rights, holding that a tenant in exclusive possession is entitled to exclude all others, including the landlord, absent statutory authority. The judge emphasised that the Civil Procedure Rules cannot alter substantive property rights and concluded that CPR 70.2A could not authorise forced entry, particularly where the obligation was framed as permitting access rather than performing a positive act capable of substitution.
Therefore, the judge in Taylor Clark Ltd v Mohamed had a prime opportunity to shift judicial trend on this issue. The decision marks a clear judicial shift back toward a more pragmatic and enforcement-focused approach. District Judge Le Bas declined to follow the Emmanuel decision, finding its reasoning flawed in principle. Central to the Emmanuel decision was the characterisation of the tenant’s contractual obligations. However, the Court accepted that an access covenant constitutes a form of prior consent by the tenant to the landlord entering the property in defined circumstances. Accordingly, enforcement of that covenant does not render the landlord a trespasser.
In its discussion, the Court drew a distinction between requiring a tenant to “give permission” and requiring them to “facilitate access”. The former would impermissibly interfere with possessory rights; the latter merely enforces an existing contractual obligation. On this basis, the definition of “act” in CPR 70.2A was identified as the practical facilitation of access, such as unlocking or opening the door. Where the tenant fails to comply, that act may, so far as practicable, be carried out by another party.
Importantly, the Court rejected the argument that reliance on CPR 70.2A in this context amounts to an impermissible modification of substantive law. Instead, it characterised the rule as a procedural mechanism giving effect to existing common law and contractual rights. The Court ultimately exercised its discretion by granting the tenant a final opportunity to comply, failing which the landlord was authorised to force the lock at the tenant’s expense.
While this notable decision is not binding on first-instance judges, by virtue of the Court in which it was given, it strengthens the judicial narrative supporting enforcement through force. For commercial landlords and housing providers, the decision offers a more workable route to overcoming resisted attempts to access their property to ensure compliance with other laws and obligations. However, the continuing inconsistency at County Court level underscores the need for clarification on this issue. Until such time that it reaches the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court, outcomes will remain fact-sensitive and dependent on judicial preference for either approach, as laid out in the Emmanuel and Taylor Clark decisions.
